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CONFLICT BETWEEN STATE STATUTE AND MUNICIPAL
ORDINANCE
Union Sand & Supply Corp. v. Village of Fairport
172 Ohio St. 387, 176 N.E.2d 224 (1961)
Plaintiff sought to enjoin the enforcement of a municipal ordinance
fixing the maximum weights of vehicles using streets and highways within
the village limits. The ordinance empowered the mayor to reduce the maxi-
mum weights up to twenty-five per cent when the weather or physical con-
dition of the streets required. The Ohio Revised Code permitted heavier
maximum weights than those permitted by village ordinance. Plaintiff
maintained that the ordinance was in conflict with the state statute, and for
that reason was invalid. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the lower court,
holding the ordinance enforceable and not in conflict with the Ohio Revised
Code.2
Article XVIII, section 3 of the Ohio Constitution gives municipalities
the power to pass police regulations so long as they do not conflict with
general laws.3 The court in the principal case acknowledged that there is
no judicially established method for determining when there is a conflict
and asked for legislative assistance in the future. 4 In deciding cases of
conflict between statutes and ordinances, the courts have employed various
techniques.5 The most frequently used test is: "Does the ordinance permit
or license that which the statute forbids or prohibits and vice versa?"8' In
applying it the courts have not been consistent,7 and the test is not satis-
factory in cases of conflict-by-implication.8
The Ohio Supreme Court in Froelich v. City of ClevelandO upheld a
3 Ohio Rev. Code § 5577.04 (1953).
2 Union Sand & Supply Corp. v. Village of Fairport, 172 Ohio St. 387, 176 N.E.2d
224 (1961).
3 Wilson v. Zanesville, 130 Ohio St. 286, 199 N.E. 187 (1935); Fitzgerald v. City of
Cleveland, 88 Ohio St. 338, 103 N.E. 512 (1913).
Ohio Const. art. 18, § 3 (1912): "Municipalities shall have authority to exercise
all powers of local self-government and to adopt and enforce within their limits
such local police, sanitary and other similar regulations, as are not in conflict with
general laws."
4 Union Sand Corp. v. Fairport, supra note 3, at 391: "It is apparent that the situa-
tion presented in the instant case is a perplexing one and might well be the subject of
study on the part of both the General Assembly and the legislative bodies of the various
municipalities throughout the state, to the end that some satisfactory solution might be
reached."
5 See Leis v. Cleveland R.R. Co., 101 Ohio St. 162, 148 N.E. 73 (1920).
6 Struthers v. Sokol, 108 Ohio St. 263, 140 N.E. 519 (1923).
7 See Cleveland v. Betts, 168 Ohio St. 486, 154 N.E.2d 917 (1958); Cincinnati v.
Correl, 141 Ohio St. 535, 49 N.E.2d 412 (1943); Cleveland v. Baker, 83 Ohio L. Abs.
502, 167 N.E.2d 119 (Ct. App. 1960).
8 See, e.g., Nell House v. Columbus, 144 Ohio St. 248, 58 N.E.2d 665 (1944);
Schneiderman v. Sesanstein, 121 Ohio St. 80, 167 N.E. 154 (1929).
9 99 Ohio St. 376, 124 N.E. 212 (1929).
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vehicle weight ordinance similar to that involved in the principal case in
the face of a General Code section prohibiting municipalities from decreas-
ing weight limits on vehicles traveling their roads.' 0 The court said that the
Home Rule Amendment to the Constitution of Ohio1 authorizes cities to
exercise the power of self-government and that the proper exercise of this
power is not pre-empted by general laws. It classified this matter as one of
administrative management,' 2 and implied that in these matters the munici-
pality was supreme. A later case, Schneiderman v. Sesanstein, held a munici-
pal regulation limiting automobile speed to fifteen miles per hour unconsti-
tutional when the state regulation prescribed twenty-five miles per hour
as being reasonable and proper. 13 The court found conflict due to a General
Code provision similar to the one before the Froeliclh court which prohibited
the diminishing of provisions of the disputed statute. 4 In 1937, an ordinance
limiting the weight of trucks below that permitted by state statute was
held to be in conflict.' 5 This seems consistent with Schneiderman. Schneider-
man, however, did not overrule Froelich, but only cited it without mention-
ing any conflict. 16 These cases would seem to indicate that no consistent
rule has been developed even in the narrow area of speed and weight limita-
tions on vehicles.
The earlier cases such as Froelich accorded great weight to the powers
given to local government, but the courts have recently been uncertain as to
the limits of that power. This uncertainty stems from the vague wording of
the amendment itself.'7 It may be that a court's disposition toward self-
government will affect its decision as to whether there is a conflict.
It is submitted that an approach which would give more consistent re-
sults in determining when there is a conflict would be to (1) determine
10 A recent case upholding the validity of ordinances restricting the weights of
trucks is Perkins v. Village of Quaker City, 165 Ohio St. 120, 133 N.E.2d 595 (1956).
11 Ohio Const. art. XVIII, § 3 (1912).
12 Fordham & Asher, "Home Rule Powers in Theory and Practice," 9 Ohio St.
L.J. 18, 52 (1948).
1 Schneiderman v. Sesanstein, supra note 8.
14 Schneiderman v. Sesanstein, supra note 8, at 87, 167 N.E. at 160: "The legis-
lative body of the municipality has no authority to prescribe a rate of speed or fix
or prescribe a standard contrary to or inconsistent with the provisions of a statute."
The court also found a conflict-by-implication, holding that a statute which provides
a greater speed than that authorized as unlawful implies that driving at a lesser speed
is not unlawful, and that a municipal ordinance setting lower speed limits conflicts
with the statute. The ordinance would seem to conflict with a purpose to facilitate
transportation and commerce.
'5 Lakewood v. Johnson, 8 Ohio Op. 205 (Lakewood Mun. Ct. 1937), dismissed for
want of debatable question, 133 Ohio St. 110, 11 N.E.2d 1022 (1937).
16 Richter Concrete Corp. v. Reading, 166 Ohio St. 279, 142 N.E.2d 525 (1957).
The court indicated in dicta that Froelich was a precedent for the power of a munici-
pality to pass an ordinance to protect its streets.
17 Fordham & Asher, supra note 12, at 54; State ex rel. Canada v. Phillip, 168 Ohio




whether the ordinance is a police regulation, and (2) determine whether
that police regulation and general law have conflicting purposes. If the
impact of the ordinance is primarily limited to persons or property within
the community, then it should be considered a matter of self-government, a
subject best disposed of by the community's electorate through its local
council. If, on the other hand, the impact of the ordinance extends sub-
stantially beyond the limits of the municipality and affects interests not
represented on the city council, then the ordinance may be considered a
police regulation with the consequence that the state legislature shall have
the last word should a conflict of policy arise.'
In order to determine whether there is a conflict, the courts will have
to determine the legislative purposes of the statute and of the ordinance.
One difficulty courts encounter in searching for legislative intent is the lack
of published legislative histories in Ohio. This may oblige the court to
determine what proper purposes may be served by both laws, and then to
decide whether they are reconcilable under all the circumstances of the case
before it.19 In this connection, courts should try to determine if the statute
was intended to be exclusive or merely supplemental. If exclusive, then any
municipal regulation in the area covered by the statute will by definition
conflict.20 If supplemental, then the municipalities could enact ordinances
dealing with the same subject. Also one can look to prior cases to determine
if there has been a judicial policy developed with regard to statutes dealing
with a particular subject matter. Perhaps the most helpful rule of statu-
tory construction in conflict cases is that of pari -materia, i.e., determining
the legislative policy by examining other statutes dealing with the general
subject matter.2 1
There was no direct conflict involved in the principal case, but there
was a possibility of conflict-by-implication if one views the state law as
limiting the weights of vehicles to facilitate all other commerce and trans-
port, consistent with its desire to minimize damage to streets. When the
municipality sets a lower weight limit, it may restrict commerce and trans-
port authorized by state law, thus causing a conflict. The court in Fairport
Is Supra note 3.
19 In traffic regulations of the kind the instant court dealt with, the following
are feasible purposes of the statutes:
a. Safety
b. Convenience and comfort
c. Maintenance and cost
d. Facilitating transportation and commerce
The first three of these purposes would be complemented by such an ordinance, and
the only possible conflict would be with facilitating transportation and commerce.
20 Fremont v. Keating, supra note 10.
21 In Akron v. Scalera, 135 Ohio St. 65, 19 N.E.2d 279 (1939), the city enacted
an ordinance prohibiting beer sales on Sunday, and General Code 6064-1 said
intoxicating liquors should not be sold on Sunday. This regulation was ruled con-
stitutional as the statutes on this subject put various restrictions on the sale of beer,
and a sub-division of the state could completely prohibit the sale of beer.
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sought the legislative intent. An outstanding indication of the legislature's
intent was the fact that the legislature repealed the very section on which
the court had relied in Schneiderman to invalidate a similar municipal
ordinance. This evidences a purpose to allow municipalities to legislate in
the area of weight limits without fear of impeding transportation or com-
merce. So, the possibility of a conflict by implication never materialized,
especially when one considers the delegation of authority expressly made in
Revised Code sections 715.22 and 723.01 which specifically give municipali-
ties power to regulate trucks and prevent injury to streets.2 2 The result of
the case, therefore, appears to be correct.
The problems the Home Rule Amendment presents can never be com-
pletely eradicated without legislative action.23 The Ohio law in this area is
confused, and it must be observed that the courts will hesitate to rule that
there is a conflict unless it is clear and direct.24 The instant case holds that
a municipality may enact an ordinance prescribing lower weight limits than
those authorized by the state. In addition, the case may indicate a greater
willingness to sustain local ordinances, particularly when other statutes
contain at least a generalized grant of power to municipalities on the same
subject.
22 Ohio Rev. Code § 715.22 reads in part:
Any municipal corporation may:
(A) Regulate the use of carts, drays, wagons, hackney coacnes, omnibuses,
automobiles, and carriages kept for hire or livery stables purposes;
(B) License and regulate the use of the streets by persons who use
vehicles, or solicit or transact business thereon;
(D) Regulate the transportation of articles through such highways and
prevent injury to such highways from overloaded vehicles.
Ohio Rev. Code § 723.01 provides:
Municipal corporations shall have special power to regulate the use of
the streets. The legislative authority of such municipal corporation shall
have the care, supervision, and control of public highways, streets, avenues,
alleys, sidewalks, public grounds, bridges, aqueducts, and viaducts within
the municipal corporation and shall cause them to be kept open, in
repair, and free from nuisance.
23 Fordham & Asher, supra note 12, at 54.
24 Cincinnati v. Luckey, 85 Ohio Op. 463, 87 N.E.2d 894 (1949), aff'd 153 Ohio St.
247, 91 N.E.2d 477 (1950).
